Commentary on a Rare Luddite Victory - The Templeton Dragon Fund Shareholder Proposal No-Action Letter by Friedman, Howard M.
Volume 1 Issue 1 Article 3 
1999 
Commentary on a Rare Luddite Victory - The Templeton Dragon 
Fund Shareholder Proposal No-Action Letter 
Howard M. Friedman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vjlim 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Secured Transactions Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Howard M. Friedman, Commentary on a Rare Luddite Victory - The Templeton Dragon Fund Shareholder 
Proposal No-Action Letter, 1 Vill. J.L. & Investment. Mgmt. 41 (1999). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vjlim/vol1/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Journal of Law and Investment Management by an 
authorized editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
Commentary on a Rare Luddite
Victory - The Templeton Dragon
Fund Shareholder Proposal
No-Action Letter
Howard M. Friedman*
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) no-action
letters have been described by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit as "non-binding statements
of the SEC's intent not to prosecute a potential rule
violation."1 Formally they have no binding effect even on
the parties to whom the letter is issued.2 Nevertheless,
lawyers have come to rely on SEC no-action letters for
guidance in interpreting federal securities laws. 3 Several
developments explain the increasing importance of no-
action letters. First, on-line services such as LEXIS and
Westlaw have made no-action letters more accessible.
Second, the body of securities case law that is available for
guidance is diminishing as the courts and Congress
narrow private rights of action. Third, more disputes are
resolved through arbitration, resulting in unwritten
opinions. Therefore, the rare no-action letter that appears
to depart radically from more formal SEC pronouncements
deserves attention. 4
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. Professor
Friedman is author of SECURITIES REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE (2d ed.,
1998).
'New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 13 (2d
Cir. 1995) (citing Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v.
SEC, 15 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1994)).
2 See Amalgamated Clothing, 15 F.3d at 257 (noting that SEC no-
action letter does not fix any legal relationship between parties).
3 See Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 Bus.
LAw. 1019 (1987) (noting that no-action process is chief mechanism
"permitting the public and practitioners to obtain the informal views of
the SEC staff on proposed transactions that appear to raise compliance
issues under applicable federal securities laws and the rules
thereunder"); Richard H. Rowe, A SEC Staff "No-Action" Position: An
Impervious Shield Against Liability or a Paper Tiger?, 6 INSIGHTS 21 (July
1992).
4 For judicial discussion of another example of a no-action letter that
departed from a formal SEC pronouncement, see New York City
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The June 1998 Templeton Dragon Fund no-action letter5
may be unique in departing radically from two separate
lines of formal Commission interpretations without
acknowledging either departure. Particularly since 1995,
the SEC has been in the forefront of those encouraging
innovative uses of Internet technology to disseminate
information to investors.6 In both letter and spirit,
Templeton Dragon Fund reverses course. Moreover, in
1992, the SEC adopted extensive amendments to its proxy
rules to encourage more communication among
shareholders who were not actually seeking authority to
vote the shares of others. It did this by deregulating a good
deal of speech among investors who were not themselves
seeking proxy authority. No longer was every
communication that related to matters on an upcoming
meeting agenda to be screened in advance by the SEC. The
requirement to speak only through a formal proxy
statement was to be applied more selectively. 7 Templeton
Dragon Fund also repudiates an important application of
these 1992 liberalizations.
Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
that no-action letter was interpretive, not legislative, and thus not
subject to notice and comment procedures, and was reviewable as
arbitrary or capricious agency action only through a suit against the
issuer).
5Templeton Dragon Fund, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL
337469 (June 15, 1998) [hereinafter Templeton Dragon Fund].
6 The two major SEC releases that initiated the SEC's pro-technology
stance were Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Securities
Act Release No. 7,233, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3,200 (Oct. 6, 1995)
and Use of Electronic Media by Broker-Dealers, Transfer Agents and
Investment Advisers for Delivery of Information, Securities Act Release
No. 7,288, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3,201 (May 9, 1996). See
generally HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE (2d
ed., 1998).
7 See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange
Act Release No. 31,326, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,051 (Oct. 16, 1992) (noting that new rules remove "unnecessary
government interference in discussions among shareholders of
corporate performance").
2
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I. BACKGROUND OF TEMPLETON DRAGON FUND
The SEC's shareholder proposal rule, Rule 14a-8,
embodies finely tuned compromises between the interests
of management and those of shareholders. 8 If a
shareholder who has not solicited its own proxies must
first introduce a proposal that management opposes from
the floor of the shareholders' meeting, the proposal will
surely be defeated. Management will hold sufficient
proxies, with discretionary authority to vote on proposals
raised for the first time at the meeting, to defeat any such
proposal. 9 Even so, it is typically cost-prohibitive for a
small shareholder to solicit its own proxies in order to
obtain passage of a resolution at the shareholders' meeting
of a publicly-held company. Therefore, for many years,
Rule 14a-8 has permitted a shareholder to submit a
proposal to management that the shareholder wishes to
place before fellow investors at the company's annual
meeting, along with a statement in support of the
proposal.' 0 The shareholder proposal and supporting
8 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8, 63 Fed. Reg.
29,118, 29,119 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8)
(providing new rule for shareholder proposals). For a discussion of the
many factors that are involved, see Proposed Amendments to Rule
14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals
by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 19,135, [1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,262 (Oct. 14, 1982).
9 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-4(c), 63 Fed. Reg. 29,118,
29,118 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c)) (permitting
management to obtain in its proxy discretionary authority to vote on
matters that are raised at meeting without advance notice to
management). Even where management has been notified in advance, if
the proponent is not soliciting its own proxies and is not making use of
Rule 14a-8, management may seek discretionary authority so long as it
discloses how it intends to exercise its discretion.
10 The first shareholder proposal rule was adopted in 1942. See Part
240 - General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
7 Fed. Reg. 10,655, 10,656 (Dec. 21, 1942) (formalizing earlier
interpretations of Commission). See Arthur H. Dean, Non-Compliance
With Proxy Regulations: Effect On Ability of Corporation To Hold Valid
Meeting, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 483, 497-506 (1939) (discussing proxy
regulations relating to shareholder proposals and problems confronting
management). For a history of the rule's development, see IV SECURITIES
REGULATION 1998-2052 (Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, 3d ed. 1990);
Donald E. Schwartz & Elliott J. Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC
Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEO. L.J. 635, 654-57 (1977) (providing
history of Rule 14a-8).
3
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statement together may not exceed 500 words.
Management may object to inclusion of the shareholder
proposal and supporting statement in its proxy materials
on several grounds set forth in Rule 14a-8(i).1' In such a
case the SEC staff issues a letter in which the staff either
agrees or disagrees with management's contention that
the shareholder proposal may be excluded. 12
The Templeton Dragon Fund letter involved an attempt
by Newgate LLP, a shareholder in the Fund, to place its
shareholder resolution in Templeton Dragon Fund's proxy
statement. Underlying the letter is a broader movement by
shareholders of closed-end mutual funds to force
management to convert their funds to open-end
investment companies. 13 Closed-end funds often sell at a
discount from their net asset value while the price of open-
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(i), 63 Fed. Reg. 29,118,
29,120 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)). According to
the rule, there are 13 grounds for omitting a shareholder proposal and
supporting statement from the proxy. See id.
12 Under Rule 14a-8, if a shareholder submits a proposal that the
company proposes to exclude, the company must submit its reasons
and a supporting opinion of counsel to the SEC no later than 80
calendar days before it files its definitive proxy statement. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(j), 63 Fed. Reg. 29,118,
29,120 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(j)). It must at the
same time furnish the shareholder with a copy of its submission. See id.
The shareholder is permitted, but not required, to file a response.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(k), 63 Fed. Reg. 29,118,
29,120 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(k)). After
considering this material, the staff of the SEC will write to the company
either agreeing or disagreeing with its assertion that the proposal may
be excluded. Sometimes the staff takes the position that the proposal
must be included only if the shareholder proponent makes specified
revisions to it. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(m)(3)(i), 63
Fed. Reg. 29,118, 29,121 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8(m)(3)(i)). At the time of the Templeton Dragon Fund no-
action letter, similar provisions appeared in Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Rules 14a-8(d)-(e), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d)-(e) (1998).
13 See Carol Carangelo, SEC Clears Hurdle for Closed-End Fund
Shareholders, FUND DIRECTIONS, June 1998, at 2; Carole Gould, How a
Closed-End Fund Aims to Tame Its Discount, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1998,
§ 3, at 8; Eric Rosenbaum, Mercury Closed-End Fund Lowers Open-
Ending Hurdle, FUND ACTION, Aug. 10, 1998, at 1, 12.
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end funds reflects no similar discount. 14 Therefore,
opening a closed-end fund results in an instant increase in
value for existing shareholders. Despite this, managers of
closed-end funds have resisted change, often arguing that
opening the fund would have other negative impacts.
In March 1998, Newgate, which owned over 1.8 million
shares of Templeton Dragon Fund, notified Fund
management that it planned to introduce a resolution at
the 1998 annual meeting recommending that the Fund's
directors take all necessary action to convert from closed-
end to open-end status. Invoking Rule 14a-8, Newgate
requested that its resolution, along with a supporting
statement, be included in the Fund's proxy statement that
would be sent to shareholders. Newgate attempted to
alleviate the problem posed by the 500 word limitation
through the use of new technology. The supporting
statement began as follows:
We are limited by Federal law to a 500 word
statement. Accordingly, we hope that shareholders
will carefully review the 4 points set forth below.
Additional historical performance data on this Fund
can be accessed on Newgate's Internet site at
newgateglobal.com 
1 5
Fund management objected to including the proposal in
the Fund's proxy statement. In particular, it objected to
the reference to Newgate's Internet Web site. Three
separate objections were made. The most straight forward
was that reference to the Web site would subvert "the
intent of the 500 word limit of paragraph (b)( 1)." According
to management, making additional information available
in this way would circumvent "the spirit, if not the letter"
of Rule 14a-8's limitation on the length of shareholder
proposals and accompanying supporting statements.
A second objection focused on the impermanent nature
of information on a Web site. Because Newgate might
14 For discussion of discounts in closed-end funds, see The Internet
Closed-End Fund Investor, A Deeper Look at Discount/Premium (visited
Oct. 22, 1998) <http://www.icefi.com/icefi/tutorial/anal-dis.htm>.
1 Templeton Dragon Fund, supra note 5, at * 1.
5
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continually change the content of its Web site, it would not
be able to furnish the SEC with a copy of the information
that would be on the site in the future. This meant that
potentially false and misleading information on the site
would not be subject to SEC staff review. In addition,
management asserted, that it would not be able to readily
respond to changing information on Newgate's Web site
without the considerable cost of preparing, filing and
mailing supplemental proxy materials to its shareholders.
This, management argued, "subverts the proxy process." 16
A third objection was that the historical performance
data that Newgate claimed was on its Web site in fact was
not available there and had not been otherwise furnished
to the Fund. This, it was argued, made the reference to
Newgate's Web site misleading.
In a typically cryptic no-action letter, the SEC's Division
of Corporation Finance agreed with the Fund that "[tihere
is support for your view that the reference to Proponent's
internet site in the supporting statement potentially may
violate the proxy process requirements of paragraph (b)(1)
of the Rule" and therefore the reference could be omitted
from the Fund's proxy statement. 17 This language in the
no-action letter left unclear whether the staff agreed with
all, or only some, of the arguments made by the Fund,
since paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 14a-8 was the provision in
the Rule that both limited the length of the shareholder
proposal and supporting statement to 500 words and
required the supporting statement to be furnished to the
issuer at the same time as the shareholder proposal itself
was furnished. 18
16 Templeton Dragon Fund, supra note 5, at *2.
17 Templeton Dragon Fund, supra note 5, at *7.
1 8 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(b)(1), 17 C.F.R.§ 240.14a-8(b)(1) (1998). On May 28, 1998, Rule 14a-8 was amended.
The 500 word limitation of paragraph (b)(1) now appears in paragraph(d). See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(d), 63 Fed. Reg.
29,118, 29,119 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d)).
6
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II. THE USE OF THE INTERNET IN PROXY
SOLICITATIONS
Since 1995, the Internet has become an increasingly
important tool in proxy solicitations. For uncontested
meetings, companies increasingly post their proxy
statements and annual reports to shareholders on their
Web sites, delivering these documents electronically and
permitting proxies to be returned via the Internet.19 In
proxy contests, the Internet is beginning to be used as a
supplement to the proxy statement to furnish more
information to interested shareholders. 20 For example, in
their 1996 challenge to the management of RJR Nabisco,
Carl Icahn and Bennett Lebow posted follow-up
information on the Web site of Georgeson & Co., their
professional proxy soliciting firm.21 Where dissidents have
already sent out a proxy statement, this kind of additional
soliciting material does not need to be pre-cleared by the
SEC. It must merely be filed with the SEC and the relevant
stock exchanges on the date that it is first made available
to shareholders. 22
Just as a Web site seems an appropriate vehicle for
supplementing dissidents' arguments in a proxy fight, it
seems similarly well suited for supplementing the bare-
bones 500 word (or less) statement in support of a
shareholder's proposal under Rule 14a-8. Indeed, nothing
in the SEC's Templeton Dragon Fund no-action letter
precludes shareholder proponents from placing additional
information on a Web site. The no-action letter merely
prevents the shareholder from calling the Web site to
fellow-shareholders' attention through management's
proxy statement. In reaching that result, the arguments
accepted by the SEC seem surprisingly unpersuasive.
19 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at ch. 11.2 0 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at ch. 12.
21 See Hal Lux, Internet Becomes Tool In Nabisco Proxy Fight, INV.
DEALERS' DIGEST, Jan. 29, 1996, at 8 (discussing experiment with
Internet in proxy fight and noting that while "the Web is not likely to be
the deciding factor in [proxy] fight... proxy experts say it is a medium
worth the experiment").
22Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-6(b), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-6(b) (1998), see FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 12.01[b].
7
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III. WHY THE SEC WAS WRONG
A. 500 WORD LIMITATION
The simplest argument put forward by management was
that the shareholder's Web site violated the 500 word
limitation for shareholder proposals in Rule 14a-8. This
deceptively literal conclusion fails to address the policies
behind Rule 14a-8's 500 word limitation. While the SEC
has not always spelled out the rationale for its long-
standing limitation on the length of shareholder proposals
and/or supporting statements, 23 the least persuasive
explanation is that the government has determined that
shareholder proponents should not speak at length. In the
past, when government has attempted - usually
unsuccessfully - to restrict the quantity of speech, its
goal has been to equalize the relative ability of competing
sides to reach an audience.24 That cannot be the SEC's
23 The exact limitation has varied over time. Early versions of Rule
14a-8 contained only a limitation on the length of the supporting
statement. The earliest version (then numbered Rule 14a-7) merely
limited supporting statements to 100 words. See Part 240 - General
Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 7 Fed. Reg.
10,655, 10,656 (Dec. 21, 1942). When that limitation began to be
abused through the use of lengthy "Whereas clauses" in the proposal
which were in fact arguments for adoption of the proposal, the
Commission amended Rule 14a-8 to provide that these clauses would
be counted as part of the supporting statement, but raised the word
limit for the supporting statement to 200 words. See Adoption of
Amendments to Rules 14a-5 and 14a-8 under the Exchange Act,
Exchange Act Release No. 9,784, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,997 (Sept. 22, 1972). In 1976, the Commission
added a separate 300 word limitation for the shareholder proposal
itself. See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security
Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, 11976-1977 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,812 (Nov. 22, 1976) (noting that
300 word limitation was due in part to several proposals that "'exceeded
the bounds of reasonableness"). In 1983, these were combined into a
500 word limit for the proposal and supporting statement together. See
Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No.
20,091, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,417
(Aug. 16, 1983).24 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (holding that "the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of
8
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goal here since management has no limits imposed on the
length of the counter-arguments that it places in its proxy
statement. Indeed, the SEC's entire attempt to restore
shareholder democracy has been a battle against the
voicelessness of the small shareholder. Rule 14a-8 was an
attempt to give the small shareholder some power, not to
limit his or her voice. 25
A different rationale is suggested by the administrative
history of Rule 14a-8 and seems more persuasive. In its
1976 amendments to Rule 14a-8 that, for the first time,
imposed length restrictions on the shareholder's
resolution itself, as well as on the supporting statement,
the SEC noted:
[1In recent years several proponents have exceeded the
bounds of reasonableness . . . by submitting
proposals that are extreme in their length. Such
practices are inappropriate under Rule 14a-8 not only
because they constitute an unreasonable exercise of
the right to submit proposals at the expense of other
shareholders but also because they tend to obscure
other material matters in the proxy statements of
issuers, thereby reducing the effectiveness of such
documents. 26
Stated more fully, since Rule 14a-8 forces management
to include unwanted material in its proxy statement, Rule
14a-8 is designed to limit the burden and costs imposed
on management and other shareholders. A 500 word
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment..."); see also First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-92 (1978) (same). Cf. Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-60 (1990) (upholding
prohibition on corporate expenditures to support or oppose candidate
on ground that restriction "ensures that expenditures reflect actual
public support for the political ideas espoused by corporations").
2 5 See Donald E. Schwartz & Elliott J. Weiss, An Assessment of the
SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEO. L.J. 635, 638-48 (1977)
(discussing costs and benefits of Rule 14a-8).
2 6 See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security
Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,812, at 87,127 (Nov. 22, 1976).
9
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statement adds little in printing or postage costs to the
corporation's mailing. On the other hand, permitting an
unlimited amount of material to be included at corporate
expense could create a substantial burden. The length
limitation also avoids deflecting attention from
management's basic message. A very lengthy discussion of
a shareholder proposal might overwhelm other - and to
management, more important - issues discussed in the
proxy statement. By limiting the length of shareholder
proposals, Rule 14a-8 still permits management to focus
the attention of shareholders on the other issues it wishes
to bring to a vote. Neither the goal of avoiding new costs
nor of assuring appropriate focus on other items is
undercut by permitting the shareholder proponent to
include in his or her 500 word statement a reference to a
Web site.27
B. PRIOR REVIEW
Fund management also argued that the impermanent
nature of information of a Web site would preclude prior
review by the SEC staff of potentially false and misleading
information. The SEC, however, has disclaimed any
interest in being able to review such communications in
advance. In fact, the SEC has put forward a wide range of
initiatives in recent years to lessen its role as censor of
materials sent out to shareholders in connection with
shareholder meetings. In 1992, the SEC adopted major
amendments to its proxy rules that were designed to
eliminate much of the SEC's previous role as censor of
speech relating to upcoming meetings.28 Proxy statements
27 It might be thought that while the goal of Rule 14a-8 is not to place
an absolute limit on shareholder argumentation, perhaps its goal is to
limit speech unless a shareholder proponent first files a full proxy
statement with the SEC. In that way, the SEC would have the
opportunity to review the accuracy of long arguments. This argument
for prior review is no more persuasive than the argument for prior
review made by Fund management, which is discussed below.
28 See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange
Act Release No. 31,326, 11992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,051 (Oct. 16, 1992) (noting that amendments to rules "eliminate
10
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for routine meetings no longer have to be filed in advance
for SEC review. 29 Management merely needs to file a
definitive copy of the proxy statement when it sends the
proxy statement to shareholders. Even in mergers and
contested elections where proxy statements do need to be
filed in advance, additional soliciting material only needs
to be filed at the same time that it is sent to shareholders. 30
Thus no advance review is mandated for material placed
on a Web site after a proxy statement is mailed, even in
proxy contests. In adopting amendments eliminating the
advance filing of most proxy material, the SEC observed:
The Commission believes that the most cost-effective
means to address hyperbole and other claims and
opinions viewed as objectionable is not government
screening of the contentions or resort to the courts.
Rather, the parties should be free to reply to the
statements in a timely and cost-effective manner,
challenging the basis for the claims and countering
with their own views on the subject matter through
the dissemination of additional soliciting material. 3'
More importantly, the 1992 amendments deregulated
much speech relating to upcoming shareholder meetings
where the speaker is not actually soliciting proxy authority
and does not otherwise, because of a substantial interest
in the matter being voted upon, stand to receive a benefit
that will not be shared pro rata by all other holders of the
unnecessary regulatory obstacles"). In explaining the new rules, the
SEC stated, "The amendments adopted today reflect a Commission
determination that the federal proxy rules have created unnecessary
regulatory impediments to communication among shareholders and
others and to the effective use of shareholder voting rights." Id. at
83,355.
29 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-6(a), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-6(a) (1998) (providing filing requirements of preliminary
proxy statements).
30Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-6(b), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-6(b) (1998).
31 Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act
Release No. 31,326, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,051, at 83,365 (Oct. 16, 1992).
11
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same class of securities.3 2 In such cases, no proxy
statement needs to be filed or distributed. In its Release
adopting these rules, the SEC stated explicitly that
sponsorship of a Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal does not
create a substantial interest that would preclude the
proponent from freely communicating with other
shareholders, unless there is something special about the
content of the proposal that creates a substantial interest.
The mere fact of inclusion of the proposal does not create
such an interest.33
C. BURDEN OF RESPONSE
A subsidiary part of Templeton management's argument
was that it would not be able to readily respond to changed
information on the shareholder's Web site without costly
preparation, filing and mailing of supplemental proxy
materials to its shareholders. This ignores the fact that
Templeton need not use "snail mail" to respond to
proponent's cyberspace message. A response through
Templeton's own Web site would be speedier, less costly
and probably more effective when management is
countering other Internet-based speech. Anyone with
sufficient computer knowledge to access Newgate's Web
site could in turn easily access Templeton's.
32 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-2(b)(1), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-2(b)(1) (1998). The one exception is institutional investors
which are required to file a Notice of Exempt Solicitation pursuant to
Rule 14a-6(g) within three days of sending out material, to guard
against secret solicitation campaigns by large shareholders. See
Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act
Release No. 31,326, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,051, at 83,359 (Oct. 16, 1992).33 See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange
Act Release No. 31,326, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,051, at 83,361 (Oct. 16, 1992).
12
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IV. A NARROW BASIS FOR
THE SEC'S DETERMINATION
While the major arguments put forward by Templeton
Dragon Fund management and accepted by the SEC staff
seem unpersuasive, the facts do give the staff an
acceptable narrow ground for its conclusion. Interpreting
the no-action letter in this way may save it from
threatening future innovative approaches to promoting
shareholder democracy. Newgate's supporting statement
submitted for inclusion in the Fund's proxy statement
specifically said that additional historical performance
data on Templeton Dragon Fund was available at
Newgate's Web site. In fact no such information had been
placed on the Web site.
Rule 14a-8 permits management to exclude a
shareholder proposal or supporting statement if its
language is materially false or misleading.a4 This might
well be an acceptable basis for permitting management to
exclude Newgate's supporting statement, or at least for
requiring Newgate to modify its statement to indicate
merely that Newgate planned in the future to post
additional material relating to the shareholder proposal on
its Web page.
V. PROPOSED RULE CHANGES TO FACILITATE
USE OF WEB SITES TO
SUPPLEMENT SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
Despite my criticism of the SEC's willingness to permit
the exclusion of Newgate's supporting statement,
management of Templeton Dragon Fund did raise two
objections that call for further examination and that
suggest the need for new rule making.
34 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(i)(3), 63 Fed. Reg.
29,118, 29,120 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(3)). At
the time of the Templeton Dragon Fund no-action letter, these provisions
appeared in Rule 14a-8(c)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(3) (1998).
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A. REQUIRING MUTUAL HYPERLINKS
Templeton Dragon Fund's management was concerned
about its ability to respond to ever-changing content on
the proponent's Web site. As suggested above, a like-kind
response, that is, one through management's own Web
site, is an inexpensive and effective way to participate in an
ongoing exchange of ideas with a shareholder proponent. A
rule change would facilitate this kind of on-line
interchange.
The SEC has a legitimate interest in making certain that
shareholders have convenient opportunities to consider
arguments on both sides of an issue. Therefore, it should
consider mandating through Rule 14a-8 mutual
hyperlinks between Web pages arguing both sides of an
issue. If proponents set up a Web page to furnish
additional information, they should be required to include
on the page a prominent hyperlink to any management
Web page that has been created to discuss management's
side of the issue. Similarly, any management page
discussing the issue should contain a hyperlink to the
relevant page on the proponent's Web site.35 Moreover, if
management posts its proxy statement on the World Wide
Web, proponent's textual reference to its Web site should
also be a hypertext link to the site.
Mutual hyperlinks will not only assure that
shareholders have ready access to both sides' arguments,
they will also provide an easy method for each side to
check on whether the other has recently changed the
material on its Web site. Any new rule might go further and
require each side to notify the other by e-mail when it
makes a change to its Web site relating to the shareholder
proposal. This addition, however, is probably unnecessary
since it requires little effort to check the linked Web site
regularly during the period between the mailing of the
proxy statement and the convening of the annual meeting.
35 The SEC should probably consider imposing a similar requirement
when Web sites are used by opposing interests in any type of proxy
solicitation.
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A notification provision would call attention to minor
changes that might go unnoticed through a routine check
of the Web site. However, such a provision might also
invite unnecessary disputes about whether timely notice
was given. The rule mandating mutual hyperlinks needs to
be limited to situations in which one side has notified the
other of the existence of its Web site, and the SEC will need
to stand ready to adjudicate disputes about inclusion of
hyperlinks in the same way that it passes on other
disputes under Rule 14a-8.
One other technical concern arises in implementing
competing Web-based discussions. Under present Rule
14a-6(b), management (but not the Rule 14a-8
shareholder proponent) is required to file all of its
additional soliciting material with the SEC. 36 This means
that the material on management's Web site, and each
changed version of the material, must be filed at the time it
is first posted on management's server. As EDGAR is
transformed to an Internet based system,37 this will
become a simple task. With little effort, management can
save its Web page to a file and transmit that to the SEC
electronically just as any other EDGAR document would
be transmitted.
B. PRIOR ON-LINE MSSTATEMENTS
AS A BASIS FOR EXCLUSION
A second legitimate concern raised by Templeton Dragon
Fund management is the added danger of false and
misleading statements being disseminated when a
proponent can constantly change the content of its Web
36 The 1992 amendments eliminated the reciprocal obligation of non-
management shareholders who were not actually seeking proxy
authority to file soliciting material with the SEC in order to encourage
free discussion among shareholders of matters on an upcoming
shareholder meeting agenda. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying
text.
37 For discussion of the conversion of the SEC's Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval system (EDGAR) to an Internet-based
system, see SEC Awards EDGAR Modernization Contract, 30 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) 1016 (July 3, 1998); FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 15.04.
15
Friedman: Commentary on a Rare Luddite Victory - The Templeton Dragon Fund
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
56 VILLANOVA JOURNAL OF LAW AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
site. The danger of misleading argumentation through
constantly changing content is not unique to Web sites.
Telephone calls and individual e-mail communications
during the proxy process pose similar issues. However, the
broader reach of statements on a Web site, and other
widely disseminated on-line messages, creates special
risks of influencing votes through false or exaggerated
claims. Particularly when new content is disseminated
shortly before a shareholders' meeting, there may not be
an effective opportunity for rebuttal. Relegating
management to seeking remedial relief through litigation
under Rule 14a-9 may be an inadequate alternative.
Therefore, I suggest an additional rule change to deal with
the heightened threat of false and misleading information
that is introduced late in the proxy process.
Few shareholder proposals in fact succeed. 38 Often the
goal of proponents is merely to obtain sufficient votes in
favor of their proposal so that it can be resubmitted the
following year. The strong message of such a vote may lead
to successful negotiations or voluntary action by
management on the subject matter of the proposal.39
Under Rule 14a-8(i)(12), depending on how often the
proposal has been included during the last five years, the
proponent must obtain from 3% to 10% of the votes cast to
include it the following year. An amendment to Rule 14a-8
should provide that an additional basis for excluding a
shareholder proposal is that the proponent, during the
past five years, included materially false or misleading
information relating to a prior shareholder proposal on a
Web site or in other broadly disseminated Internet
communications. In addition to information on the
proponent's Web site, the exclusion would apply to
38 See Robert Todd Lang et al., Shareholder Initiatives: Proposals and
Solicitations, 4 SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES § 53.06[I][a] (A.A. Sommer,
Jr., ed., 1998) (noting that in 1993, only nine shareholder proposals
passed).
39 See id. § 53.02111[b], at 36-37; § 53.0611][a], at 31-32 (noting that
willingness of management to address shareholder concerns depends
on extent to which management believes shareholder can mobilize
larger number of shareholders for future action).
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materially false or misleading information that the
proponent disseminated through such means as group
e-mail messages, Internet bulletin boards or on-line chat
rooms.
Such an additional basis for exclusion will not cast the
SEC in any dramatically different role than it now assumes
in passing on whether management may exclude a
shareholder proposal. Currently one basis for
management's exclusion of a proposal is that the proposal
or supporting statement is materially false or misleading
in violation of Rule 14a-9. 40 Also if the shareholder
proponent believes that management's statements in
opposition to the proposal violate rule 14a-9, the SEC's
rule encourages the shareholder to promptly notify the
Commission staff.4'
VI. CONCLUSION
New technology creates possibilities for improving
disclosure, increasing shareholder protection, promoting
capital formation and furthering shareholder democracy.
Innovative uses of technology require nurturing. Nipping
them in the bud through reflexive literalism or in response
to pleas of corporate management that are not justified in
terms of broader regulatory policy discourages the
experimentation which the SEC has so carefully nourished
since 1995. Hopefully, the Templeton Dragon Fund no-
action letter will come to be seen as a too-hasty response
and will in fact lack precedential authority as no-action
letters are supposed to do. Better yet, the Commission
should formally repudiate the narrow and stilted
interpretation of Rule 14a-8 reflected in Templeton Dragon
Fund.
4 0Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(i)(3), 63 Fed. Reg.
29,118, 29,120 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(3)).
41 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(m)(2), 63 Fed. Reg.
29,118, 29,121 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(m)(2)).
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